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The appellate jurisdiction given the Supreme Court of the
United States by Article III of the Constitution does not include
appellate review of judgments of military tribunals, by certiorari
or otherwise., Congress has not authorized the civil courts to
exercise appellate jurisdiction over military tribunals.2 It follows
that the civil courts have no appellate power over military tribunals
and may review their judgments, if at all, only by way of collateral
attack based on the tribunal's want of jurisdiction3 In the case
of general courts-martial of the Army and Air Force Congress has
provided an elaborate system of appellate review within the serv-
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Judge Advocate General of the Army, and Lieutenant Colonel Reginald C.
Miller, Judge Advocate General's Corps, in reading the manuscript and
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views expressed.
'Ex parte Vallandigham, 1 Wall. 243 (U.S. 1863); Ex parte Mason, 105
U.S. 696 (1882); In re Vidal, 179 U.S. 126 (1900).
'The Administrative Procedure Act expressly excepts the conduct of mili-
tary and naval functions from its requirements of fair hearing prior to adjudi-
cation and excepts courts-martial, military commissions and military or naval
authority exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory from its
provisions for judicial review. §§2, 5, Act of June 11, 1946, 60 STAT. 237, 239,
5 U.S.C. §§1001, 1004.
'Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65 (U.S. 1857) ; Carter v. Roberts, 177 U.S. 496
(1900); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
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ices 4 and has recently declared that sentences so reviewed shall be
final and conclusive and action taken pursuant thereto shall be
binding upon all courts of the United States.5 The law of collateral
attack in the absence of this statutory declaration will first be con-
sidered and the effect of the declaration will be discussed in the
last section of this study.
The commonest form of collateral attack on military judgments
is by habeas corpus but some other types are possible, including
suit against the United States for pay or allowances forfeited by
sentence of military tribunal6 and civil action for damages in a
federal or state court against the individuals who carry out the
judgment of such a tribunal.7 As a valid judgment of a court-
'§§223-230, Title II, Act June 24, 1948, 62 STAT. 634-639, 10 U.S.C.A.
§§1518-1525; Act June 25, 1948, 62 STAT. 1014, 5 U.S.C.A. §627k. See Fratcher,
Appellate Review in American Military Law, 14 Mo. L. REv. 15-75 (1949).
"The appellate review of records of trial provided by this article, the
confirming action taken pursuant to articles 48 or 49, the proceedings, findings,
and sentences of courts-martial as heretofore or hereafter approved, reviewed,
or confirmed as required by the Articles of War and all dismissals and dis-
charges heretofore or hereafter carried into execution pursuant to sentences
by courts-martial following approval, review, or confirmation as required by
the Articles of War, shall be final and conclusive, and orders publishing the
proceedings of courts-martial and all action taken pursuant to such proceed-
ings shall be binding upon all departments, courts, agencies, and officers of the
United States, subject only to action upon application for a new trial as pro-
vided in article 53." A.W. 50, §226, Title II, Act June 24, 1948, 62 STAT. 635,
10 U.S.C.A. §1521. See also A.W. 53, §230, 62 STAT. 638, 10 U.S.C.A. §1525,
note 17, infra.
These provisions became effective February 1, 1949. Legislation -which
would extend them to naval courts-martial is pending. Sec. 76, H.R. 4080,
81st Cong. (1949).
'Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543 (1887); United States v. Brown,
206 U.S. 240 (1907); Shilman v. United States, 164 F. 2d 649 (2d Cir. 1947),
cert denied, 333 U.S. 837 (1948). The usefulness of this remedy is limited
by the statute of limitations and by doctrines that the appointment and con-
firmation of a successor vacates military office notwithstanding the invalidity
of a court-martial sentence of dismissal [Blake v. United States, 103 U.S. 227
(1880)] and that acquiescence by an officer on the active list in his dismissal
bars recovery. Ide v. United States, 25 Ct. Cl. 401 (1890), aff'd, 150 U.S. 517
(1893); Armstrong v. United States, 26 Ct. Cl. 387 (1891), aff'd, 159 U.S.
246 (1895). McLean v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 775 (W.D. S.C. 1947)
applied to a court-martial judgment a federal statute authorizing suit against
the United States for damages for imprisonment under a sentence reversed
on appeal.
Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch 331 (U.S. 1806); Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat.
19 (U.S. 1827); Wilkes v. Dinsman, 7 How. 89 (U.S. 1848); Dynes v. Hoover,
20 How. 65 (U.S. 1857); Milligan v. Hovey, Fed. Cas. No. 9,605 (C.C. D. Ind.
1871); Waters v. Campbell, Fed. Cas. No. 17,265 (C.C. D. Ore. 1877); Zim-
merman v. Poindexter, 78 F. Supp. 421 (Hawaii 1947). See Stein, Judicial
Review of Determinations of Federal Military Tribunals, 11 BROOKLYN L. REv.
30, 32-35 (1941).
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martial is a bar to prosecution in a federal civil court for the same
offense, such a prosecution is a method of testing the validity of a
military judgment.$ Attempts to attack judgments of military
tribunals by prohibition, injunction and suit for declaratory judg-
ment have been unsuccessful but there may be situations in which
prohibition would be a proper remedy.9
As state courts have no power to discharge on habeas corpus
persons held under claim or color of the authority of the United
States they may not inquire by habeas corpus into the validity of
a sentence of a federal military tribunal.10 The original jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court of the United States is limited to cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and
those in which a state is a party and its power to entertain an
original proceeding in habeas corpus is restricted to cases of these
types.-1 As it may issue writs of habeas corpus in other types of
cases only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and it has no appellate
jurisdiction over military tribunals, the court cannot inquire into
the lawfulness of confinement under sentence of a military tribunal
except on appeal from an inferior federal civil court. 2 United
States courts of appeals may issue writs of habeas corpus only in
aid of their appellate jurisdiction, which does not extend to mili-
tary tribunals, so they, too, may inquire into judgments of military
tribunals by habeas corpus only on appeal from an inferior federal
court.1 3 It follows that only United States district courts may en-
' Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907) ; Johnsen v. United States,
41 F. 2d 44 (9th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 864 (1930). Cf. United
States v. Praeger, 149 Fed. 474 (W.D. Texas 1907) (criminal prosecution of
civilian for refusal to testify before a court-martial); United States v. Mac-
Kenzie. Fed. Cas. No. 18,313 (S.D. N.Y. 1843) (criminal prosecution for
offense for which defendant was in process of trial by court-martial).
Prohibition: Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167 (1886); United States v.
TManey, 61 Fed. 140 (C.C. D. Blinn. 1894); see Ex parte Henderson, Fed. Cas.
No. 6,349 (C.C. D. Ky. 1878). Injunction: Carter v. Woodring, 92 F. 2d 544
(D.C. Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 752 (1937); In re Meader, 60 F. Supp.
80 (E.D. N.Y. 1945) (motion to suppress evidence in pending trial before court-
martial). Cf. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932). Declaratory judg-
ment: Brown v. Royall, 81 F. Supp. 767 (D.D.C. 1949).
' United States v. Booth, 21 How. 506 (U.S. 1858) ; Tarble's case, 13 Wall.
397 (U.S. 1871).
Ex parte Barry, 2 How. 65 (1844).
Ex parte Betz and companion cases, 329 U.S. 672 (1946) ; In re Kraut-
wurst and companion cases, 334 U.S. 826 (1948); In re Gronwald, 334 U.S.
857 (1948). Cf. Ex parte Mason, 105 U.S. 696 (1882). The Court can enter-
tain appeals from inferior federal courts in habeas corpus cases. EX parte
Yerger, 8 Wall. 85 (U.S. 1868).
' Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942); Price v.
Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948). Findings of the fact made by the district court
and supported by evidence will not be disturbed on appeal. Schita v. Cox, 139
F. 2d 971 (8th Cir. 1944), cert. denied sub. non. Schita v. Pescor, 322 U.S.
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tertain original proceedings in habeas corpus to obtain release from
confinement under sentences of federal military tribunals.
A district court may not entertain a habeas corpus proceeding
unless the prisoner is confined within its district.14 Consequently a
person in confinement under sentence of a military tribunal in a
foreign country or elsewhere not within the territorial jurisdiction
of a district court has no remedy by habeas corpus.15 In the absence
of special circumstances, available remedies by way of appeal must
be exhausted before seeking release by habeas corpus.' This rule
would seem to require a prisoner under sentence of Army or Air
Force general court-martial to await final military appellate review
of his sentence and to petition the Judge Advocate General for a
761 (1944), rehearing denied, 323 U.S. 810 (1944).
1 Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948). Cf. Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323
U.S. 283 (1944).
McGowan v. Moody, 22 App. D.C. 148 (1903) (Guam); Ex parte Flick,
76 F. Supp. 979 (D.C. 1948) (Germany), aff'd on other grounds, Flick v.
Johnsen, 174 F. 2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 70 S. Ct. 158 (1949).
Contra: Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F. 2d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. granted
sub. nom. Johnsen v. Eisentrager, 70 S.Ct. 158 (1949) ; In re Bush, Hab. Corp.
No. 3,544, D.C., June 21, 1949; Concurring opinion of Douglass, J. in Kod
Hirota v. MacArthur, 69 S. Ct. 1,238 (1949). See G.L's Overseas and Habeas
Corpus, 1 STANFORD L. REV. 555-559 (1949). But see Fairman, Some New
Problems of the Constitution Following the Flag, 1 STANFORD L. REv. 587,
631-643 (1949). United States courts have no power to review in any way the
sentence of a military tribunal appointed by an officer of the United States
forces acting under authority of the United States and allied foreign powers.
Koki Hirota v. MacArthur, 69 S. Ct. 197 (1948), rehearing denied, 69 S. Ct.
1238 (1949). See Fairman, op. cit., 589-603.
"In re Lincoln, 202 U.S. 178 (1906). See The Freedom Writ-The Ex-
panding Use of Federal Habeas Corpus, 61 HARV. L. REv. 657, 664-667 (1948).
1 "Under such regulations as the President may prescribe, the Judge Advo-
cate General is authorized, upon application of an accused person, and upon
good cause shown, in his discretion to grant a new trial, or to vacate a sen-
tence, restore rights, privileges, and property affected by such sentence and
substitute for a dismissal, dishonorable discharge, or bad conduct discharge
previously executed a form of discharge authorized for administraive issuance,
in any court-martial case in which application is made within one year after
final disposition of the case upon initial appellate review: Provided, That with
regard to cases involving offenses committed during World War II, the appli-
cation for a new trial may be made within one year after termination of the
war, or after its final disposition upon initial appellate review as herein pro-
vided, whichever is the later: Provided, That only one such application for a
new trial may be entertained with regard to any one case: And provided
further, That all action by the Judge Advocate General pursuant to this article,
and all proceedings, findings and sentences on new trials under this article,
as approved, reviewed, or confirmed under articles 47, 48, 49 and 50, and all
dismissals and discharges carried into execution pursuant to sentences ad-
judged on new trials and approved, reviewed, or confirmed, shall be final and
conclusive and orders publishing the action of the Judge Advocate General or
the proceedings on new trial and all action taken pursuant to such proceed-
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new trial or other relief under Article of War 5317 before seeking
habeas corpus in a district court."7
It was early determined that, as military tribunals are courts
of special and limited jurisdiction, their judgments are somewhat
more vulnerable to collateral attack for want of jurisdiction than
those of civil courts of general jurisdiction. 8 Nevertheless, the
rule that the record of a court of special and limited authority is
void on its face unless it shows all jurisdictional requisites9 is not
applied to records of military tribunals. The judgment of a mili-
tary tribunal will not be disturbed, despite the failure of its record
to show jurisdictional requisites, if, as a matter of fact, it had
jurisdiction. 20 In general the subjects open to inquiry by a civil
court in a collateral attack on a judgment of a military tribunal
are: (1) whether the tribunal was legally constituted; (2) whether
it had jurisdiction of the person; (3) whether it had jurisdiction
of the subject matter; (4) whether its sentence was conformable
to law; and (5) whether its procedure complied with statutory or
executive regulations of a jurisdictional nature.2 1 In short, the in-
quiry is limited to the question of whether the military tribunal
had jurisdiction to hear the case before it and to render the judg-
ment; no question of error in the exercise of jurisdiction being re-
viewable on collateral attack.2 2 The scope of inquiry under each of
the mentioned heads will be examined in the order in which they
are enumerated.
CONSTITUTION OF THE MILITARY TRIBUNAL
Under the English law in force at the time of the American
Revolution the constitution, jurisdiction and procedure of courts-
ings, shall be binding upon all departments, courts, agencies and officers of
the United States." A.W. 53, §230, Act June 24, 1948, 62 STAT. 639, 10
U.S.C.A. §1525. See Fratcher, op. cit. note 4, supra, 68.
' Whelchel v. McDonald, 176 F. 2d 260 (5th Cir. 1949) ; Spencer v. Hunter,
177 F. 2d 370 (10th Cir. 1949); Massey v. Humphrey, 85 F. Supp. 534 (M.D.
Pa. 1949); Contra: Burchfield v. Hiatt, 86 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Ga. 1949).
" Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch 331 (U.S. 1806); see Ex parte Watkins, 3
Pet. 193 (U.S. 1830).
Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350 (U.S. 1873).
'Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U.S. 11 (1921); United States ex rel. Hartley v.
Malanaphy, 81 F. Supp. 316 (E.D. N.Y. 1948).
'Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19 (U.S. 1827) ; Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65
(U.S. 1857) ; Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543 (1887) ; Carter v. Roberts,
177 U.S. 496 (1900); McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U.S. 49 (1902); Collins v.
McDonald, 258 U.S. 416 (1922).
'Waite v. Overlade, 164 F. 2d 722 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S.
812 (1948). Compare United States ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F. 2d 664 (3d
Cir. 1944), taking the position that the scope of inquiry on collateral attack
has recently been broadened to include questions other than jurisdiction. This
assertion will be discussed infra.
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martial, the type of military tribunal used to enforce the internal
discipline of the forces, were governed partly by statute and partly
by executive regulation; military tribunals established for other
purposes were not governed by statute. The Federal Constitution
adopted the existing English scheme, empowering Congress to
make rules for the government and regulation of the land and
naval forces but making no specific provision as to military tri-
bunals set up for other purposes. Whether Congress has power to
limit the authority of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to
establish military tribunals (usually called military commissions,
provost courts or military government courts) to carry out mili-
tary government of occupied enemy territory, execute martial rule
of domestic territory disturbed by war or insurrection, or enforce
the laws of war, is an undecided question.
Incident to collateral attack on a judgment of a military tri-
bunal a civil court may inquire whether the officer who appointed
the tribunal had lawful authority to do so. 23 In the case of courts-
martial this inquiry is usually as to whether the appointing au-
thority was authorized by statute to appoint such a court24 or was
authorized by the President pursuant to statute to do So 25 but,
although the constitution of courts-martial is, in general, regulated
by statute, the President himself may appoint courts-martial with-
out statutory authority.26 The authority of the officer appointing
the tribunal need not be shown by the record of the tribunal but
may be established by evidence in the civil court.2 The order
appointing the tribunal need not be signed by the appointing au-
thority, it being sufficient that it is issued by his direction.28
As the President and superior field commanders have virtually
plenary authority without statutory warrant to appoint military
tribunals with criminal and civil jurisdiction, or both, incident to
the military government of occupied enemy or rebel territory, the
scope of inquiry in such cases is limited to the question of whether
I Pennywit v. Eaton, 15 Wall. 382 (U.S. 1873) ; Mechanic's and Trader's
Bank v. Union Bank, 22 Wall. 276 (U.S. 1874) ; United States v. Smith, 197 U.S.
386 (1905); Givens y. Zerbst, 255 U.S. 11 (1921).
1 United States v. Smith, note 23, supra.; In re Crain, 84 Fed. 788 (C.C. D.
Mass. 1897). Where a statute provides that, when the normal appointing
authority is the accuser or prosecutor, the court shall be appointed by superior
authority, it would seem that a civil court may inquire whether the appointing
authority was the accuser or prosecutor. United States ex rel. Williams v.
Barry, 260 Fed. 291 (S.D. N.Y. 1919).
Givens v. Zerbst, note 23, supra; In re Crain, note 24, supra.
Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553 (1897).
Givens v. Zerbst, note 23, supra. The Court took judicial notice of a
War Department general order by which the President delegated power of
appointment.
I McRae v. Henkes, 273 Fed. 108 (8th Cir. 1921), cert. denied sub. nom.
Henkes v. McRae, 258 U.S. 624 (1922).
276 [VCol. 10
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the tribunal was in fact appointed by the President or such a com-
mander. 29 This is true also in the case of military tribunals ap-
pointed to try enemy persons for violations of the laws of war,
whether in domestic or foreign territry.30 On the other hand, as
the authority of the President and superior field commanders to
appoint military tribunals for the trial of civilians in domestic
territory is limited to situations in which, by reason of war or in-
surrection, the civil courts cannot function and military necessity
requires such appointment, a civil court may inquire into the
factual necessity of using such tribunals and is not precluded by
the President's or the field commander's determination that mili-
tary necessity existed.2 1
If the composition of a court-martial is fixed by statute at not
less than a specified number of members, a civil court may inquire
on collateral attack whether the court-martial had that many mem-
bers22 Likewise, if a statute provides that a certain class of per-
sons shall not be eligible to sit on courts-martial, a civil court may
inquire whether persons of that class did sit and, if so, declare the
proceedings void, even though the accused did not object to the
membership of the court-martial.3 3  When the court-martial is
required by statute to be composed of officers of the command of
the appointing authority, the question of whether the members
were officers of that command may be raised.34 A recent decision
I Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. 164 (U.S. 1853) (holding that such authority
continued in conquered territory after the ratification of a treaty of peace and
until Congress provided a civil government); Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 20 How.
176 (U.S. 1857); The Grapeshot, 9 Wall. 129 (U.S. 1869); Pennywit v. Eaton,
15 Wall. 382 (U.S. 1873); Mechanic's and Trader's Bank v. Union Bank, 22
Wall. 276 (U.S. 1874); Ex parte Ortiz, 100 Fed. 955 (C.C. D. Minn. 1900)
(stating, by way of dictum, contrary to Cross v. Harrison, supra, that the
authority terminated upon ratification of a treaty of peace and cession);
United States v. Reiter, Fed. Cas. No. 16,146 (Prov. Ct., La. 1865).
'United States ex rel. Quirin v. Cox, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (the Court relied
to some extent on a statute, A.W. 15, which recognized the jurisdiction of mili-
tary commissions, but did not hold that statutory sanction is required) ; In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); Homma v. Patterson, 327 U.S. 759 (1946). See
United States ex rel. Wessels v. McDonald, 265 Fed. 754 (E.D. N.Y. 1920),
cert. dism. su'b. non. Wessels v. McDonald, 256 U.S. 705 (1921).
'Ex parte Mlilligan, 4 Wall. 2 (U.S. 1866); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327
U.S. 304 (1946); In re Egan, Fed. Cas. No. 4,303 (C.C. N.D. N.Y. 1866). See
Ex parte Vallandigham, 1 Wall. 243 (U.S. 1863); Sterling v. Constantin, 287
U.S. 378 (1932); Hammond v. Squier, 51 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wash. 1943).
Cf. E.x parte Mudd, Fed. Cas. No. 9,899 (S.D. Fla. 1868).
McDaniel v. Hiatt, 78 F. Supp. 573 (M.D. Pa. 1948).
'McClaughy v. Deming, 186 U.S. 49 (1902) (habeas corpus); United
States v. Brown, 206 U.S. 240 (1907) (suit for pay) ; Walsh v. United States,
43 Ct. Cl. 225 (1908). These cases arose under a statutory provision that
"officers of the Regular Army shall not be competent to sit on courts-martial
to try the officers or soldiers of other forces ... 1'
IDurant v. Hiatt, 81 F. Supp. 948 (N.D. Ga. 1948).
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suggests that, even in the absence of statutory prohibition, the
systematic exclusion of persons of a particular race from a court-
martial may be a ground for collateral attack, but this is most
doubtful.3 5
On the other hand, if the governing statute gives the appoint-
ing authority some latitude for the exercise of judgment as to the
proper composition of a court-martial, a civil court will not review
his decision. For example, if a statute provides that a court-
martial shall not consist of less than thirteen members where that
number can be convened without manifest injury to the service and
a court-martial of less than thirteen members is convened, a civil
court will not go into the question of whether thirteen members
could have been detailed without manifest injury to the service.36
Similarly, if a statute provides that no officer shall, when it can be
avoided, be tried by officers inferior to him in rank, a civil court
will not inquire whether a trial by juniors could have been avoided.3T
So, where a statute provides that the law member of a court-
martial shall be an officer of the Judge Advocate General's Depart-
ment, except when an officer of that department is not available
for the purpose, a civil court may not question the appointment
of an officer of another branch as law member even though officers
of the Judge Advocate General's Department are appointed to the
prosecution and defense staffs of the court-martial.38
A civil court may not inquire into the question of whether a
member of a court-martial was subject to challenge for cause,
whether or not the question was raised before the court-martial.3 0
This restrictive rule has been applied even in the flagrant case of
the officer who signed the charges acting as a witness for the prose-
'Jackson v. Gough, 170 F. 2d 630 (5th Cir. 1948), cert. denied sub. nom.
Jackson v. United States, 336 U.S. 938 (1949) (the court found that there was
no systematic exclusion and denied release on habeas corpus).
Iartin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19 (U.S. 1827): Mullan v. United States, 140
U.S. 240 (1890); Bishop v. United States, 197 U.S. 334 (1905); Kahn v. An-
derson, 255 U.S. 1 (1921); In re Crain, 84 Fed. 788 (C.C. D. Mass. 1897).
1 Mullan v. United States, 140 U.S. 240 (1890); Swaim v. United States,
165 U.S. 553 (1897).
'Henry v. Hodges, 171 F. 2d 401 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 69 S. Ct.
937 (1949), rehearing denied sub. nor Henry v. Smith, 69 S. Ct. 1167 (1949) ;
Glenn v. Hodges, 79 F. Supp. 400 (S.D. N.Y. 1948). Contra: Brown v. Hiatt,
81 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ga. 1948) , aff'd sub. nom. Hiatt v. Brown, civil action
No. 12,641, 5th Cir., June 16, 1949. The question cannot arise under the present
statute, which makes it mandatory in all cases that the law member be an
officer of the Judge Advocate General's Corps or a member of the bar certified
as qualified. A.W. 8, §206, Title II, Act June 24, 1948, 62 STAT. 628, 10
U.S.C.A. §1479.
'Keyes v. United States, 109 U.S. 336 (1883); Swaim v. United States,
165 U.S. 553 (1897).
[Vol. 10278
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cution and also as a member of the court-martial. 40 The court-
martial record need not show the qualifications of the members.
For example, if retired officers are not eligible to sit as members
of courts-martal unless recalled to active duty, the court-martial
record need not include the orders recalling retired members to
duty; such orders may be proved in the civil court.4'
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
The Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution prohibits
trial for a capital or otherwise infamous crime without present-
ment or indictment of a grand jury, "except in cases arising in the
land and naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in
time of war or public danger." 42 The jurisdiction of courts-martial
over persons is governed by statute. As to them the inquiry is
double: Is the accused a person whom the statute subjects to trial
by courts-martial of this type? Is the application of the statute to
this person prohibited by the Fifth Amendment? In the case of
military commissions, provost courts and military government
courts the inquiry is: Is the accused a person subject to trial by
military tribunal under the law of war, the law of military occupa-
tion or the law of martial rule? The form of the latter inquiry
assumes, of course, that there are implied exceptions to the grand
jury requirement of the Fifth Amendment as well as those ex-
pressed in it.-'
If a statute empowers a court-martial to try members of a par-
ticular component of the armed forces a civil court may inquire
whether, as a matter of fact and law, a person tried by this court-
martial was a member of that component. It may consider whether
the position he held constituted membership in that component,4"
'Keyes v. United States, note 39, supra.
"'McRae v. Henkes, 273 Fed. 108 (8th Cir. 1921), cert. denied sub. nom
Henkes v. McRae, 258 U.S. 624 (1922). See Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1.
(1921).
"The phrase, "when in active service in time of war or public danger,"
relates only to the militia. Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109 (1894).
" Notes 29 ,30, 31, supra.
"Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879) (naval paymaster's clerk); Johnson
v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109 (1894) (naval paymaster's clerk); McGlensy v. Van
Vranken, 163 U.S. 694 (1895), reversing Ex parte Van Vranken, 47 Fed. 888
(C.C. E.D. Va. 1891) (naval paymaster's clerk); McClaughry v. Deming, 186
U.S. 49 (1902) (volunteer officer a member of "other forces" excepted from
jurisdiction of Regular Army court-martial); In re Thomas, Fed. Cas. No.
13,888 (N.D. Miss. 1869) (naval paymaster's clerk); Smith v. United States,
26 Ct. Cl. 143 (1891) (paymaster general of the Navy); Ex parte Clark, 271
Fed. 533 (E.D. N.Y. 1921) (marine serving with the Army). Where a statute
limits court-martial jurisdiction of murder to persons belonging to a public
vessel a civil court may investigate the assignment status of the accused to
19491 279
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whether the militia organization to which he belonged had been
mustered into federal service,45 and whether he was duly enlisted46
or inducted47 into the service, even though the question was not
raised before the court-martial.48 However, a person who ac-
quiesces in an incomplete or improper induction and serves as a
soldier effects a constructive enlistment which subjects him to
court-martial jurisdiction despite the irregularity of his induc-
tion.49 Moreover, a court-martial sentence is not subject to col-
lateral attack on the ground that the enlistment of the accused was
voidable at the suit of the government for his fraudulent misrepre-
sentation of his qualifications for enlistment 0 or was voidable at
the suit of his parents because of his minority and their lack of
consent.51 The court-martial record need not establish the military
determine whether he belonged to a public vessel. Rosborough v. Rossell, 150
F. 2d 809 (1st Cir. 1945).
'Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19 (U.S. 1827); Craycroft v. United States,
48 Ct. Cl. 5 (1912).
,' Hoskins v. Pell, 239 Fed. 279 (5th Cir., 1917) (enlistment of minor under
16 void) ; McFarland v. Zuppam, 82 F. Supp. 526 (M.D. Pa. 1949).
' Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch 331 (U.S. 1806); Billings v. Truesdell, 321
U.S. 542 (1944); Ex parte Beck, 245 Fed. 967 (D. Mont. 1917); Ex parte
Dunn, 250 Fed. 871 (D. Mass. 1918); Ex parte Tinkoff, 254 Fed. 912 (D. Mass.
1919); Farley v. Ratliff, 267 Fed. 682 (4th Cir. 1920); Ex parte Thieret, 26
Fed. 472 (6th Cir. 1920); United States ex rel. Feld v. Bullard, 290 Fed. 704
(2d Cir. 1923); United States v. McIntyre, 4 F. 2d 823 (9th Cir., 1925); Ver
Mehren v. Sirmyer, 36 F. 2d 876 (8th Cir. 1929); Curia v. Pillsbury, 54 F.
Supp. 196 (S.D. Ohio 1944); In re Herman, 56 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Texas
1944); United States ex rel. Seldner v. Mellis, 59 F. Supp. 682 (M.D. N.C.
1945); Ex parte Kruk, 62 F. Supp. 901 (N.D. Cal. 1945). Contra: Ex parte
Kerekes, 274 Fed. 870 (E.D. Mich. 1921) (validity of induction irrelevant);
Ex parte Potens, 63 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Wis. 1945) (court-martial's finding of
jurisdiction conclusive on civil court).
,S Ver Mehren v. Sirmyer, note 47, supra.
"Ex parte Hubbard, 182 Fed. 76 (C.C. D. Mass. 1910) ; Mayborn v. Hefle-
bower, 145 F. 2d 864 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 854 (1945); Hibbs
v. Catovolo, 145 F. 2d 866 (5th Cir. 1945), cert. denied sub. nom. Catovolo v.
Hibbs, 325 U.S. 854 (1945); Sanford v. Callan, 148 F. 2d 376 (5th Cir. 1945),
cert. disn. sub. nro. Callan v. Sanford, 326 U.S. 679 (1945).
'In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890).
'In re Miller, 114 Fed. 838 (5th Cir. 1902), cert. denied sub nom. Miller
v. United States, 186 U.S. 486 (1902); In r Wall. 8 Fed. 85 (C.C. D. Mass.
1881); In re Davison, 21 Fed. 618 (C.C. S.D. N.Y. 1884); In re Zimmerman,
30 Fed. 176 (C.C. N.D. Cal. 1887); In re Cosenow, 37 Fed. 668 (C.C. E.D.
Mich. 1899); In re Dohrendorf, 40 Fed. 148 (C.C. D. Kans. 1889); In 70
Spencer, 40 Fed. 149 (D. Kans. 1889); In re Kaufman, 41 Fed. 876 (C.C. D.
Md. 1890); Solomon v. Davenport, 87 Fed. 318 (4th Cir., 1898); In re Dowd,
90 Fed. 718 (N.D. Cal. 1898); United States v. Reaves, 126 Fed. 127 (5th
Cir. 1903); In re Carver, 142 Fed. 623 (C.C. D. Me. 1906); Ex. parte Lew-
kowitz, 163 Fed. 646 (C.C. S.D. N.Y. 1908); Dillingham v. Booker, 163 Fed.
696 (4th Cir. 1908); Ex parte Rock, 171 Fed. 240 (C.C. N.D. Ohio 1909);
Ex parte Hubbard, 182 Fed. 76 (C.C. D. Mass. 1910); Ex parte Dunakin, 202
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status of the accused so long as it existed in fact.52
If jurisdiction under the applicable statute is dependent upon
active military status, a civil court may inquire whether the ac-
cused was effectively discharged from the service, 53 dropped from
the rolls54 or relieved from active duty55 before the court-martial
acquired jurisdiction. In such cases jurisdiction once lost is not
regained, as to offenses committed before such discharge or relief
from active duty, by the reenlistment or recall to active duty of
the accused.50 However, if the jurisdiction of a court-martial at-
taches while the accused is in an active military status it is not
divested by his discharge from that status.5 7 Moreover the Con-
gress may subject reserve personnel not on active duty to trial by
court-martial for offenses committed in that status or in a prior
Fed. 290 (E.D. Ky. 1913); United States ex rel. Laikund v. Williford, 220
Fed. 291 (2d Cir. 1915); United States ex rel. Lazaraus v. Brown, 242 Fed.
983 (E.D. Pa. 1917); Ex parte Foley, 243 Fed. 470 (W.D. Ky. 1917); Ex parte
Dostal, 243 Fed. 664 (N.D. Ohio 1917); Ex parte Rush, 246 Fed. 172 (M.D.
Ala. 1917); Ex parte Beaver, 271 Fed. 493 (N.D. Ohio 1921); Contra: In re
Baker, 23 Fed. 30 (C.C. D. R.I. 1885); Dillingham v. Bakley, 152 Fed. 1022
(4th Cir. 1907); affirming Ex parte Bakley, 148 Fed. 56 (E.D. Va. 1906). Cf.
In re lkorrissey, 137 U.S. 157 (1890); United States ex rel. Turner v. Wright,
Fed Cas. No. 16,778 (C.C., W.D. Pa. 1862).
Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U.S. 11 (1921).
Ii re Bird, Fed. Cas. No. 1,428 (D. Ore. 1871) (discharge pursuant to
void court-martial sentence did not prevent court-martial trial for other
offenses); United States ex rel. Harris v. Daniels, 279 Fed. 844 (2d Cir. 1922) ;
Ex parte Drainer, 65 F. Supp. 410 (N.D. Cal. 1946), aff'd, Gould v. Drainer,
158 F. 2d 981 (9th Cir. 1947); United States ex rel. Flannery v. Commanding
General, Second Service Command, 69 F. Supp. 661 (S.D. N.Y. 1946) (ad-
ministrative revocation of discharge ineffective); Ex parte Taylor, 73 F. Supp.
161 (D. Cal. 1947). Cf. In re McVey, 23 Fed. 878 (D. Cal. 1885).
Ex parte Wilson, 33 F. 2d 214 (E.D. Va. 1929); Ex parte Smith, 47 F.
2d 257 (E.D. Va. 1931).
"United States ex rel. Sanantonio v. Warden, 265 Fed. 787 (E.D. N.Y.
1919) ; United States ex rel. Viscardi v. MacDonald, 265 Fed. 695 (E.D. N.Y.
1920); Hironimus v. Durant, 168 F. 2d 288 (4th Cir. 1948), cert. denied sub.
nom. Durant v. Hironimus, 335 U.S. 818 (1948) (holding that placing an
officer on terminal leave did not relieve her from active duty); Durant v.
Hiatt, 81 F. Supp. 948 (N.D. Ga. 1948) (following preceding case).
ri United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210 (1949) (discharge
from and reenlistment the next day in the Navy); United States ex rel. San-
antonio v. Warden, note 54, supra (relief from active duty); United States
ex rel. Viscardi v. MacDonald, note 54, supra (relief from active duty). The
doctrine of the last two cases was questioned in Hironimus v. Durant, note 55,
supra, the court suggesting that an Army reservist might be recalled to active
duty and tried for offenses committed in a previous tour of active duty.
Barret v. Hopkins, 7 Fed. 312 (C.C. D. Kans. 1881). See Carter v. Mc-
Claughry, 183 U.S. 365 (1902). Accord: United States ex rel. Mobley v.
Handy, No. 12,853, 5th Cir., Aug. 2, 1949 (civilian accompanying the Army
abroad who escaped to the United States).
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status of active duty53 and may do the same in the case of prisoners
under sentence of court-martial who have been discharged from the
service 9 Likewise, Congress may authorize the trial by court-
martial of persons who have been discharged from the service and
have become ordinary civilians for offenses committed while in
active military or naval service.6 0 This is because, the offenses
having been committed while in the service, such trials involve
"cases arising in the land or naval forces" within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment.
Congress has power to subject retainers to the camp and other
civilians accompanying or serving with the armies of the United
States in the field or outside the United States to trial by court-
martial61 but military trial of such persons is not valid unless they
fall within a class as to which jurisdiction has been conferred by
statute.62 In such cases a civil court will make an independent
investigation of the factual basis of jurisdiction over the persone
'United States ex rel. Pasela v. Fenno, 167 F. 2d 593 (2d Cir. 1948),
cert. dism., 335 U.S. 806 (1948) (offense committed while not on active duty).
I Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1 (1921) ; In re Craig, 70 Fed. 969 (C.C., D.
Kans. 1895) ; Mosher v. Hudspeth, 123 F. 2d 401 (10th Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
316 U.S. 670 (1942), rehearing denied, 316 U.S. 711 (1942); M sher v. Hunter,
143 F. 2d 745 (10th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 800 (1945), rehearing
denied, 324 U.S. 888 (1945), 326 U.S. 806 (1945). See Carter v. McClaughry,
183 U.S. 365 (1902).
'In re Bogart, Fed. Cas. No. 1,596 (C.C. D. Cal. 1873); Ex parte Joly,
290 Fed. 858 (S.D. N.Y. 1922); Terry v. United States, 2 F. Supp. 962 (W.D.
Wash. 1933); United States ex rel. Marino v. Hildreth, 61 F. Supp. 667 (E.D.
N.Y. 1945). Contra: United States ex rel. Flannery v. Commanding General,
Second Service Command, 69 F. Supp. 661 (S.D. N.Y. 1946) (Holding A.W.
94, §1, ch. II, Act June 4, 1920, 41 STAT. 805, 10 U.S.C. §1566, unconstitutional
in this respect). Cf. En parte Henderson, Fed. Cas. No. 6,349 (C.C., D. Ky.
1878); United States v. Kelly, 15 Wall. 34 (U.S. 1872); United States v.
Landers, 92 U.S. 77 (1875).
'En parte Gerlach, 247 Fed. 616 (S.D. N.Y. 1917) (discharged mate of
Army transport returning as a passenger on another Army transport); Ex
parte Falls, 251 Fed. 415 (D. N.J. 1918) (cook on Army supply ship); Ex
parte Jochen, 257 Fed. 200 (S.D. Tex. 1919) (quartermaster superintendent
with troops in the field); Hines v. Mikell, 259 Fed. 28 (4th Cir. 1919), cert.
denied sub. norm. Mikell v. Hines, 250 U.S. 645 (1919) (auditor in office of
constructing quartermaster of training camp); In re Di Bartolo, 50 F. Supp.
929 (S.D. N.Y. 1943) (discharged employee of civilian firm under contract
with the Army to service British planes in enemy territory conquered and
occupied by British forces); McCune v. Kilpatrick, 53 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Va.
1943) (cook on Army transport about to sail); In re Berue, 54 F. Supp. 252
(S.D. Ohio 1944) (seaman on vessel with Army cargo); Perlstein v. United
States, 151 F. 2d 167 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. diem. sub. noam. Perlstein v. Hiatt,
348 U.S. 822 (1946) (facts similar to In re Di Bartolo, supra); Grewe v.
France, 75 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Wis. 1948) (discharged Army employee in
occupied enemy territory).
IHammond v. Squier, 51 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wash. 1943) (seaman on
vessel carrying Navy cargo tried by military commission).
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including, where pertinent, the question of whether the troops
were "in the field. 164
The question of the jurisdiction over persons exercisable by
non-statutory military tribunals appointed to carry out military
government of occupied enemy or rebel territory, to execute mar-
tial rule of domestic territory disturbed by war or insurrection,
or to enforce the laws of war, has rarely been involved in litigation
in the civil courts. It has been decided that a military commission
sitting in domestic territory which is not in a zone of military oper-
ations and where the civil courts are functioning normally has no
jurisdiction over a civilian citizen charged with aiding the enemy
by discouraging the war effort65 but that such a tribunal does have
jurisdiction of a member of the enemy forces charged with viola-
tion of the laws of war even though he is a citizen of the United
States."
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
In determining whether a tribunal had jurisdiction over the
subject matter the possible topics of investigation include the suf-
ficiency of the preliminary proceedings, whether the pleadings
state an offense, whether that offense is within the jurisdiction of
the tribunal, and whether facts peculiar to the particular case bar
trial for the offense.
It will be recalled that the Fifth Amendment prohibits prosecu-
tion in the civil courts for a capital or otherwise infamous crime
without an indictment or presentment of a grand jury. If there is
no indictment or presentment a sentence is subject to collateral
attack67 but mere irregularities in the composition or procedure of
the grand jurys or the conduct of the preliminary investigation
are not jurisdictional.6 ' The indictment or presentment is the basic
'Note 61, supra; Ex parte Henderson, Fed. Cas. No. 6,349 (C.C. D. Ky.
1878) (former military supply contractor); Ex parte Weitz, 256 Fed. 58 (D.
MIass. 1919) (driver employed by contractor erecting training camp). Cf.
Holmes v. Sheridan, Fed. Cas. No. 6,644 (C.C. D. Kans. 1870); Walker v.
Chief Quarantine Officer, 69 F. Supp. 980 (Canal Z. 1943).
', Hines v. Mikell, note 61, supra.
' Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (U.S. 1866). See Duncan v. Kahanamoku,
327 U.S. 304 (1946); In re Egan, Fed. Cas. No. 4,303 (C.C. N.D. N.Y. 1866).
' United States ex rel. Quirin v. Cox, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). See EX parte
Mudd, Fed. Cas. No. 9,899 (S.D. Fla. 1868); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1.
(1946).
'Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885).
'Ex parte Harding, 120 U.S. 782 (1887); Matter of Moran, 203 U.S. 96
(1906); Kaizo v. Henry, 211 U.S. 146 (1908); United States ex rel. Potts v.
Rabb, 141 F. 2d 45 (3d Cir. 1944), cert denied, 322 U.S. 727 (1944); United
States ex tel. McCann v. Thompson, 144 F. 2d 604 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 790 (1944).
c' Price v. Johnston, 144 F. 2d 260 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
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pleading which invokes the jurisdiction of the trial court. In the
military and naval practice the basic pleading consists of sworn
charges. Since 1920 it has been provided by statute that no charge
will be referred to a general court-martial of the Army or Air
Force for trial until after a thorough and impartial investigation
thereof shall have been made.70 Although several inferior federal
courts had held or suggested that the absence or improper conduct
of such an investigation was a ground for collateral attack on the
judgment of a court-martial,7 ' the Supreme Court has determined
that the pre-trial investigation is not jurisdictional7 2 and it is sub-
mitted that this determination is sound, both as a matter of law
and as a matter of policy, considering the practical difficulties
encountered by military commanders under field and combat
conditions.
If a statute requires that the accused be served with a copy of
the charges against him at the time of his arrest the sentence is
probably subject to collateral attack if he is not served with charges
at all7 3 but not if service is merely delayed until some time after
789 (1944), rehearing denied 323 U.S. 819 (1945); Young v. Sanford, 147 F.
2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 886 (1945); Burall v. Johnston,
146 F. 2d 230 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945).
- A.W. 70, §1, Ch. II, Act June 4, 1920, 41 STAT. 802, 10 U.S.C. §1542;
A.W. 46(b), §222, Title II, Act June 24, 1948, 62 STAT. 633, 10 U.S.C.A.
§1517.
'Romero v. Squier, 133 F. 2d 528 (9th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 318 U.S.
785 (1943); Reilly v. Pescor, 156 F. 2d 632 (8th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329
U.S. 790 (1946); Hironimum v. Durant, 168 F. 2d 288 (4th Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 818 (1948); Benjami vn. Hunter, 169 F. 2d 512 (10th Cir.
1948); Brown v. Sanford, 170 F. 2d 344 (5th Cir. 1948); De War v. Hunter,
170 F. 2d 993 (10th Cir., 1948, cert. denied, 69 S. Ct. 1048 (1949), rehearing
denied, 69 S. Ct. 1493 (1949); Hicks v. Hiatt, 64 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa.
1946); Anthony v. Hunter, 71 F. Supp. 823 (D. Kans. 1947) (the only case
in which a prisoner was actually released from custody on this ground);
Flackman v. Hunter, 75 F. Supp. 871 (D. Kans. 1948); Richardson v. Zuppan,
81 F. Supp. 809 (M.D. Pa. 1949); Durant v. Hiatt, 81 F. Supp. 948 (N.D. Ga.
1948). Cf Jackson v. Gough, 170 F. 2d 630 (5th Cir. 1948), cert. denied mcb.
nom. Jackson v. United States, 336 U.S. 938 (1949); Henry v. Hodges, 171
F. 2d 401 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 69 S. Ct. 937 (1949), rehearing denied
sub. nom. Henry v. Smith, 69 S. Ct. 1167 (1949); Becker v. Webster, 171 F.
2d 762 (2d Cir. 1949); Glenn v. Hodges, 79 F. Supp. 400 (S.D. N.Y. 1948);
Ex parte Steele, 79 F. Supp. 428 (M.D. Pa. 1948). This view is favored in
Schwartz, Habeas Corpus and Court-Martial Deviations from the Articles of
War, 14 Mo. L. Rnv. 147, 152-158 (1949).
Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695 (1949), rehearing denied, 69 S. Ct.
1492 (1949). Accord: United States ex rel. Young v. Lehman, 265 Fed. 852
(D. Mo. 1920) (investigation by draft board prior to trial for draft desertion) ;
Arnold v. Cozart, 75 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Tex. 1948); Adams v. Hiatt, 79 F.
Supp. 433 (M.D. Pa. 1948).
'See Smith v. United States, 36 Ct. Cl. 304 (1901), rev'd, United States
v. Smith, 197 U.S. 386 (1905). That the charges were not under oath is not
jurisdictional. McClellan v. Humphrey, 83 F. Supp. 510 (M.D. Pa. 1949).
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the original arrest.7 4 Under the military practice charges are re-
ferred for trial to a court-martial by the commander who appoints
the court-martial or his successor in command. Military lawyers
consider that the lack of or defects in an order of reference for
trial are not jurisdictional because the commander's approval of
the sentence ratifies the court-martial's assumption of jurisdic-
tion.7 5 The civil courts appear to agree with this view.Th
Military charges consist of the charge proper, which is a gen-
eral statement of the offense, such as "murder, in violation of the
92nd article of war" or merely "violation of the 92nd article of
war," and the specification, a detailed statement of the facts con-
stituting the offense. It is well settled that military charges need
not be framed with the technical precision of a common law in-
dictment, it being sufficient if they inform the accused of the
general nature of the offense with which he is charged and the
time, place and circumstances under which it was committed. 7 7 If
the offense charged is a common law crime or a crime defined by
statute the civil court will examine the specification to determine
whether the facts alleged constitute the crime charged.7 8 A like
examination will be made in the case of a charge of violation of
the laws of war.7 9 On the contrary, if the charge is a violation of
customary military law or the customs of the sea (normally laid
in military pleading as conduct prejudicial to good order and mili-
tary discipline, conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman or
scandalous conduct tending to the destruction of good morals), a
civil court will not look beyond the charge; the determination of a
'Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109 (1894); United States v. Smith, 197 U.S.
386 (1905); In re Crain, 84 Fed. 788 (C.C. D. Mass. 1897). Cf. Rogers v.
United States, 270 U.S. 154 (1926).
CMi ETO 393 (1943), 3 BuLL. J.A.G. 54 (1944).
Flackman v. Hunter, 75 F. Supp. 871 (D. Kans. 1948). Cf. United States
e:x rel. Hartley v. Malanaphy, 81 F. Supp. 316 (E.D. N.Y. 1948).
Collins v. McDonald, 258 U.S. 416 (1922) ; In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1,
17 (1946); United States v. Maney, 61 Fed. 140 (C.C. D. Minn. 1894);
Johnson v. Biddle, 12 F. 2d 366 (8th Cir., 1926) ; Bigrow v. Hiatt, 70 F. Supp.
826, 74 F. Supp. 240 (M.D. Pa. 1947), aff'd, 168 F. 2d 992 (3d Cir. 1948);
Randle v. Sanford, 79 F. Supp. 585 (N.D. Ga. 1946).
' Collins v. McDonald, note 77, supra; Anderson v. Crawford, 265 Fed. 504
(8th Cir. 1920); Johnson v. Biddle, note 77, supra; Ex parte Drainer, 65 F.
Supp. 410 (N.D. Cal. 1946), aff'd, Gould v. Drainer, 158 F. 2d 981 (9th Cir.
1947); Bigrow v. Hiatt, note 77, supra; Randle v. Sanford, note 77, supra.
I United States ex rel. Wessels v. McDonald, 265 Fed. 754 (E.D. N.Y.
1920), cert. dism. sub. iom. Wessels v. McDonald, 256 U. S. 705 (1921); United
States ex rel. Quirin v. Cox, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1
(1946) (the Court examined the bill of particulars as well as the charges and
specifications). Cf. Mechanic's and Trader's Bank v. Union Bank, 22 Wall.
276 (U.S. 1874).
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court-martial as to the sufficiency of a specification laid under such
a charge is not reviewable by the civil courts 0
A military tribunal may try the accused for several offenses at
the same time"' and no mere defect of pleading is jurisdictional.
For example, a civil court will not inquire whether the charge or
specification is laid under the wrong statute or contains allegations
which are surplusage, 2 whether two or more offenses are alleged
of several charges.8 4 It may inquire, however, whether the offense
of which the accused was found guilty is the same as, or included
in, the one with which he was charged' 5 If the charges state no
offense or state only offenses over which the military tribunal has
no jurisdiction its sentence will be held void on collateral attack8
Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65 (U.S. 1857); Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S.
167 (1886); Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553 (1897); Carter v. Mc-
Claughry, 183 U.S. 365 (1902); In re Corbett, Fed. Gas. No. 3,219 (E.D. N.Y.
1877); United States v. Maney, 61 Fed. 140 (C.C. D. Minn. 1894); Rose ex
rel. Carter v. Roberts, 99 Fed. 948 (2d Cir. 1900), cert. denied sub. nom.
Carter v. Roberts, 176 U.S. 684 (1900); Ex parte Dickey, 204 Fed. 322 (D.
Me. 1913); McRae v. Henkes, 273 Fed. 108 (8th Cir. 1921), cert. denied sub.
nom. Henkes v. McRae, 258 U.S. 624 (1922). Cf. United States v. Fletcher,
148 U.S. 84 (1893); Sanford v. Callan, 148 F. 2d 376 (5th Cir. 1945), cert.
dism. sub. noma. Callan v. Sanford, 326 U.S. 679 (1945). This rule is the same
as that applied in a collateral attack on a judgment of a federal district court:
whether the offense is one of the general class over which the court has juris-
diction may be questioned but the court's decision that the facts alleged in the
indictment constitute that offense is not subject to review. Ex parte Watkins,
3 Pet. 193 (U.S. 1830); Ex parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18 (1876); In re Coy, 127
U.S. 731 (1888). See Stein, Judicial Review of Determinations of Federal
Military Tribunals, 11 BROOKLYN L. REv. 30, 41 (1941).
"Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365 (1902); Ex parte Campo, 71 F. Supp.
543 (S.D. N.Y. 1947), aff'd, United States ex rel. Campo v. Swenson, 165 F.
2d 213 (2d Cir. 1947).
'Ex parte Mason, 105 U.S. 696 (1882); Johnson v. Biddle, 12 F. 2d 366
(8th Cir. 1926).
in a single specification" or whether the same act is made the basis
' Bigrow v. Hiatt, 70 F. Supp. 826, 74 F. Supp. 240 (M.D. Pa. 1947), aff'd,
168 F. 2d 992 (3d Cir. 1948).
'Rose ex rel. Carter v. Roberts, 99 Fed. 948 (2d Cir. 1900), cert. denied
sub. nor. Carter v. Roberts, 176 U.S. 684 (1900); Carter v. McClaughry, 183
U.S. 365 (1902); McRae v. Henkes, 273 Fed. 108 (8th Cir. 1921), cert. denied
sub. nom. Henkes v. McRae, 258 U.S. 624 (1922). Accord (civil court): Crapo
v. Johnston, 144 F. 2d 863 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 785 (1944),
rehearing denied, 323 U.S. 818 (1945), 324 U.S. 886 (1945).
"Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How., 65 (U.S. 1857) (holding that attempting to
desert is included within desertion); Bankhead v. United States, 20 Ct. CI.
405 (1885) (holding that specific acts of drunkenness are included within
habitual drunkenness).
"United States v. MacKenzie, Fed. Cas. No. 18,313 (S.D. N.Y. 1843);
Vance v. United States, 30 Ct. Cl. 252 (1895); United States ex rel. Davis v.
Waller, 225 Fed. 673 (E.D. Pa. 1915); Anderson v. Crawford, 265 Fed. 504
(8th Cir. 1920); Rosborough v. Rossell, 150 F. 2d 809 (1st Cir. 1945);
[Vol. 10
REVIEW OF MILITARY JUDGMENTS
but if any offense within the jurisdiction of the tribunal is stated,
its lack of jurisdiction over other charges does not affect the validity
of the sentence17 unless, of course, its sentence would be illegal if
imposed solely for the offense over which it has jurisdiction.88
If a statute provides that no person shall be tried by court-
martial for murder committed within the continental United States
in time of peace the test is not whether conditions were, as a matter
of fact, peaceable in the area or whether hostilities have ceased but
whether the United States as a whole is completely at peace pur-
suant to ratification of a treaty of peace.9 9 A statute requiring the
military authorities to deliver a soldier charged with a civil crime,
upon application, to the civil authorities for trial, except in time
of war, does not entitle the soldier to object to trial by court-martial
for a civil crime in time of peace 9° or to trial by a civil court for
such a crime in time of war.91
The rulings of military tribunals on defensive pleas in confes-
sion and avoidance, such as the statute of limitations92 and entrap-
ment 93 are not subject to review by the civil courts. The weight of
authority in the inferior federal courts applies the same rule to
rulings on pleas of double jeopardy.9 4 The Supreme Court has
Ex parte Drainer, 65 F. Supp. 410 (N.D. Cal. 1946), aff'd, Gould v. Drainer,
158 F. 2d 981 (9th Cir. 1947) ; Ex parte Mulvaney, 82 F. Supp. 743 (D. Hawaii
1949); McCune v. Kilpatrick, 53 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Va. 1943). Cf. Houston
v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1820) (Court considered constitutionality of statute
conferring jurisdiction) ; Johnsen v. United States, 41 F. 2d 44 (9th Cir. 1930),
cert. denied, 282 U.S. 864 (1930) ; Melvin v. United States, 45 Ct. Cl. 213 (1910)
(hazing" sufficiently definite in statute conferring jurisdiction).
" Crouch v. United States, 13 F. 2d 348 (9th Cir. 1926); Reilly c. Pescor,
156 F. 2d 632 (8th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 790 (1946); Harris v.
Sanford, 78 F. Supp. 963 (N.D. Ga. 1947).
1 Discussed infra.
'Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1 (1921); Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U.S. 11
(1921). Cf. Ex parte Ortiz, 100 Fed. 955 (C.C. D. Minn. 1900). For a
different test applied to determine the propriety of martial rule, see note 31,
supra.
Ex parte Mason, 105 U.S. 696 (1882).
1 Kennedy v. Sanford, 166 F. 2d 568 (5th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 333 U.S.
864 (1948) ; Canella v. United States, 157 F. 2d 470 (9th Cir. 1946) ; United
States v. Canella, 63 F. Supp. 377 (S.D. Cal. 1945) (thorough discussion of
the problem).
9In re Bogart, Fed. Cas. No. 1,596 (C.C. D. Cal. 1873); In re White, 17
Fed. 723 (C.C. D. Cal. 1883); In re Davison, 21 Fed. 618 (C.C. S.D. N.Y.
1884); In re Zimmerman, 30 Fed. 176 (C.C. N.D. Cal. 1887); In re Cad-
wallader, 127 Fed. 881 (C.C. D. Mo. 1904); Ex parte Townsend, 133 Fed. 74
(D. Neb. 1904).
'Romer vo. Squier, 133 F. 2d 528 (9th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 318 U.S.
785 (1943).
"In re Bogart, Fed. Cas. No. 1,596 (C.C. D. Cal. 1873); In re Esmond,
5 Mackey 64 (D.C. 1886); United States v. Maney, 61 Fed. 40 (C.C. D. Minn.
1894) ; Rose ex rel. Carter v. Roberts, 99 Fed. 948 (2d Cir. 1900), cert. denied
1949]
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considered this question on three occasions but has not decided it
because in each case it approved of the court-martial's ruling.93
When court-martial jurisdiction is dependent upon continued active
military status a court-martial has no jurisdiction over an offense
committed in a prior enlistment or tour of active duty. The claim
of discharge or release from active duty is, therefore, not merely
defensive and a court-martial's ruling on it may be challenged on
collateral attack.
96
LAWFULNESS OF THE SENTENCE
Incident to a collateral attack on a sentence of a court-martial
a civil court may examine the record of the tribunal to determine
whether it reached its findings and sentence by the majority re-
quired by statute.9 7 That the court-martial announced in pro-
nouncing sentence that a recommendation for clemency would be
made and all of the members later joined in a recommendation for
substantial reduction of the sentence does not affect the validity
of the sentence actually imposed.98 The fact that only two-thirds
of the members voted for findings of guilt does not affect the
validity of a sentence requiring a three-fourths vote if three-
sub. nom. Carter v. Roberts, 176 U.S. 684 (1900); Sanford v. Robbins, 115
F. 2d 435 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied sub. nom. Robbins v. Sanford, 312 U.S.
697 (1940). Cf In re Stubbs, 133 Fed. 1012 (C.C. D. Wash. 1905) ; Ex parte
Costello, 8 F. 2d 386 (E.D. Va. 1925) ; Wrublewski v. McInerney, 166 F. 2d
243 (9th Cir. 1948). The question of double jeopardy may not be considered
in a collateral attack on a judgment of a federal district court. Crapo v.
Johnston, 144 F. 2d 863 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 785 (1944),
rehearing denied, 323 U.S. 818 (1945), 324 U.S. 886 (1945).
" Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365 (1902); Bishop v. United States,
197 U.S. 334 (1905) ; Wade v. Hunter, 69 S. Ct. 834 (1949) (case withdrawn
from one court-martial and referred to another after the evidence and argu-
ments of counsel had been heard and the court had granted a continuance to
secure additional witnesses). See Crane, Double Jeopardy and Courts-Martial,
3 MINN. L. REV. 181, 187 (1919).
' United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210 (1949) (after
committing offense accused was discharged from the Navy and reenlisted the
following day); United States ex rel. Viscardi v. MacDonald, 265 Fed. 695
(E.D. N.Y. 1920) (naval reservist relieved from active duty after committing
offense but recalled to active duty before trial). Cf. notes 58, 60, supra.
' Stout v. Hancock, 146 F. 2d 741 (4th Cir. 1944), cert. denied sub. nom.
Hancock v. Stout, 325 U.S. 850 (1945); Hurse v. Caffey, 59 F. Supp. 363
(N.D. Tex. 1945); Ex parte Besherse, 63 F. Supp. 997 (D. Mont. 1945),
appeal dism. sub. nom. Besherse v. Weyland, 155 F. 2d 723 (9th Cir. 1946);
Ex p arte Campo, 71 F. Supp. 543 (S.D. N.Y. 1947), aff'd sub. nom. United
States ex rel. Campo v. Swenson, 165 F. 2d 213 (2d Cir. 1947); Thompson v.
Sanford, 79 F. Supp. 584 (N.D. Ga. 1946); McDaniel v. Hiatt, 78 F. Supp.
573 (M.D. Pa. 1948); Brown v. Hunter, 172 F. 2d 487 (10th Cir. 1949).
"Brown v. Hunter, 172 F. 2d 487 (10th Cir. 1949). The reason for this
procedure was that the statute, since amended in this respect, required a sen-
tence of death or life imprisonment upon conviction of rape.
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fourths voted for the sentence. 99 In the absence of statutory pro-
hibition the reviewing authority (officer who appointed the court-
martial) may return the record of trial for reconsideration of the
sentence and an increased sentence imposed upon such reconsidera-
tion is valid. 00
If a statute provides that the record of a court-martial trial
shall be examined prior to confirmation by a board of review con-
sisting of not less than three officers, a civil court may inquire
whether such examination was made but the fact that one member
of the board of review was absent is not fatal'0 ' and neither is the
fact that exhibits were withdrawn from the record before it reached
the board of review.' 0 2 If a statute requires that the sentence be
confirmed by the President or some other superior official such
confirmation is a judicial act which requires the exercise of per-
sonal discretion.' 0' However, the sign manual of the President is
not required and a civil court will not go behind a certificate of
the secretary of the department that the President did act.10 4 A
statute requiring approval of the sentence by the "commanding
officer" is satisfied by approval by the President. 01  Promulgation
of the sentence in orders is not jurisdictional, so the fact that the
accused was discharged from the service prior to promulgation does
not affect the validity of the sentence. 1 6 The President or the sec-
retary of the department acting for him may, as an incident of
the pardoning power, commute a sentence, that is, change its
nature, as from death to life imprisonment.1'0  The President may
approve the entire sentence although he disapproves some of the
"Ex parte Campo, note 97, supra. Petitioner contended that the statutory
requirement of a three-fourths vote on the sentence coerced the consciences of
the members who voted not guilty in violation of the First Amendment.
'
00Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879); Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S.
553 (1897) ; See Fratcher, op. cit., note 4, supra, 34-35, 45.
... Flackman v. Hunter, 75 F. Supp. 871 (D. Kans. 1948).
"02Romero v. Squier, 133 F. 2d 528 (9th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 318 U.S.
785 (1943). Cf. Hicks v. Hiatt, 64 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1946) [saying (the
case was moot) that appellate review was inadequate because the board failed
to find that the court-martial's errors were prejudicial]. Cf. Ex parte Mason,
256 Fed. 384 (N.D. N.Y. 1882).
"02 Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543 (1887). Accord: McLean v. United
States, 73 F. Supp. 775 (W.D. S.C. 1947). Cf. Bishop v. United States, 197
U.S. 334 (1905) ; United States ex rel. French v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 326 (1922);
Melvin v. United States, 45 Ct. Cl. 213 (1910).
20, United States v. Page, 137 U.S. 673 (1891); United States v. Fletcher,
148 U.S. 84 (1893) ; Ide v. United States, 150 U.S. 517 (1893).
'o
2 Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19 (U.S. 1827).
206 Lyon v. United States, 48 Ct. Cl. 5 (1912).
... Ex parte Wells, 18 How. 307 (U.S. 1855) (sentence of civil court) ; Mullan
v. United States, 212 U.S. 561 (1909) (naval court-martial); Aderhold v.
Menefee, 67 F. 2d 345 (5th Cir. 1933) (naval court-martial; cummutation by
Secretary of the Navy).
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findings of guilty. 08
A court-martial sentence is subject to collateral attack if its
imposition for the offenses of which the court-martial had juris-
diction and found the accused guilty is prohibited by statute or
executive regulations.10 9 If the offenses of which the court-martial
did have jurisdiction warrant the sentence, however, the fact that
it lacked jurisdiction of some of the offenses will not affect the
validity of the sentence." 0 It would seem that a sentence which is
proper as to type of punishment but excessively long is void only
as to the excess.," The civil courts recognize the rule of military
law, which differs from the common law rule, that sentences pre-
sumptively run consecutively not concurrently.12 A civil court has,
of course, no concern with the severity of a court-martial sentence
so long as it was within the power of the court-martial to impose. 1"
The court-martial may and, in the modern practice, commonly
does leave designation of the place of confinement to the reviewing
or confirming authority."4  If confinement in a penitentiary is
authorized by law for the offense involved a penitentiary may be
designated", and in such cases military prisoners are governed by
the same rules as those sentenced by the civil courts, notwith-
standing the fact that they would have more liberal parole priv-
ileges if confined in a disciplinary barracks." 6 If a statute pro-
' Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365 (1902).
... Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65 (U.S. 1857) Rose ex rel. Carter v. Roberts,
99 Fed. 948 (2d Cir. 1900), cert. denied sub. nom. Carter v. Roberts, 176 U.S.
684 (1900); Carter v. Roberts, 177 U.S. 496 (1900) ; Carter v. McClaughry,
183 U.S. 365 (1902); In re Langan, 123 Fed. 132 (C.C. E.D. Mo. 1903);
Colman v. United States, 38 Ct. Cl. 315 (1903); Tullidge v. Biddle, 4 F. 2d
897 (8th Cir. 1925); Sanford v.' Callan, 148 F. 2d 376 (5th Cir. 1945), cert.
dism. sub. nom. Callan v. Sanford, 326 U.S. 679 (1945). Contra: In re Biddle,
Fed. Cas. No. 18, 236 (C.C. D.C. 1855). Cf. Williams v. United States, 24
Ct. Cl. 306 (1889) (whether sentence sufficiently definite for enforcement).
'o Crouch v. United States, 13 F. 2d 348 (9th Cir. 1926); Harris v. San-
ford, 78 F. Supp. 963 (N.D. Ga. 1947); McClellan v. Humphrey, 83 F. Supp.
510 (M.D. Pa. 1949).
r United States v. Pridgeon, 153 U.S. 48 (1894); McKee v. Johnston, 109
F. 2d 273 (9th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 664 (1940). These cases in-
volve sentences of federal district courts.
Kirkman v. McClaughry, 160 Fed. 436 (8th Cir. 1907).
m Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65 (U.S. 1857). Cf. Burns ex rel. Burns v.
Sanford, 77 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. Ga. 1948).
114 Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U.S. 11 (1921); In re Brodie, 128 Fed. 665 (8th
Cir. 1904).
'Ex parte Mason, 105 U.S. 696 (1882); McGlensy v. Van Vranken, 163
U.S. 694 (1895), reversing Ex parte Van Vranken, 47 Fed. 888 (C.C. E.D.
Va. 1891) ; Givens v. Zerbst, note 114, supra; In re Brodie, note 114, supra;
Yates v. Hunter, 174 F. 2d 347 (10th Cir. 1949).
' Fitch v. Hiatt, 48 F. Supp. 388 (M.D. Pa. 1942); Johnson v. Hiatt, 71
F. Supp. 865 (M.D. Pa. 1947); aff'd, 163 F. 2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 333 U.S. 829 (1948).
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hibits confinement in a penitentiary unless an act or omission of
which the accused is convicted is a civil crime punishable by peni-
tentiary confinement by the civil courts, the fact that the offense
is charged as a military offense (i.e., conduct prejudicial to good
order and military discipline) will not prevent designation of a
penitentiary so long as an act involved in the offense is a civil
crime.1 1 7
If an unauthorized institution is designated as the place of
confinement the designation is subject to collateral attack 18 but
the civil court will not order the prisoner's release; it will merely
give the military authorities an opportunity to designate a proper
place of confinement.,, In the absence of statutory prohibition,
although a disciplinary barracks was originally designated as the
place of confinement, the prisoner may later be transferred to a
reformatory 'O or a penitentiary.' 2 But a statute providing that
persons sentenced to "confinement, not in a penitentiary, shall be
confined in the United States Disciplinary Barracks or elsewhere
as the Secretary of War or the reviewing authority may direct,
but not in a penitentiary," prevents transfer to a penitentiary.122
The fact that a person under sentence of court-martial is discharged
or dismissed from the service does not prevent execution of the
unexecuted portion of the sentence.2 3
REGULARITY OF TRIAL PROCEDURE
A civil court may examine the evidence received by an admin-
istrative tribunal to determine whether its findings are supported
by substantial evidence. 12 4 A civil court may not inquire into the
evidence or lack of evidence received by a military tribunal and
has no concern whatever with the weight or credibility of the evi-
dence or its sufficiency to support the findings, these questions be-
U7 Ex parte Mason, note 115, supra.
"Ex parte Hewitt, Fed. Cas. No. 6,442 (S.D. Bliss. 1869).
'Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U.S. 11 (1921) ; Kelly v. Hunter, 80 F. Supp. 851
(D. Kans. 1948). Accord: In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894) (sentence of
federal district court).
"' Green v. Schilder, 162 F. 2d 803 (10th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
838 (1947).
1 Kelly v. Hunter, 80 F. Supp. 851 (D. Kans. 1948). Cf. O'Malley v. Hiatt,
74 F. Supp. 44 (M.D. Pa. 1947).
Kelly v. Hunter, note 121, supra.
' Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365 (1902); O'Malley v. Hiatti 74 F.
Supp. 44 (M.D. Pa. 1947); Steele v. Humphrey, 80 F. Supp. 544 (M.D. Pa.
1948).
1 §10, Administrative Procedure Act. June 11, 1946, 60 STAT. 243,
5 U.S.C. §1009. Cf. Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272 (1912); United States
x rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923) ; United States ex rel. Vajtauer
v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103 (1927).
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ing wholly for the military reviewing authorities.1 2 5 A civil court
may not review a military tribunal's rulings on the admission or
exclusion of evidence, 26 even when it is alleged that the tribunal's
findings are based upon perjured evidence,. 27 a coerced confes-
Sion,128 or evidence procured by means of an unlawful search and
seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.2 9
As has been seen, a military tribunal's erroneous rulings on
questions within its jurisdiction, such as challenges, pleas, and the
admissibility of evidence, are not reviewable on collateral attack.
Some procedural requirements imposed by statute or executive
regulation are, however, jurisdictional.2 0 For example, if an execu-
tive regulation prohibits a court-martial from proceeding with a
case after the issue of insanity is raised, its doing so may be beyond
its jurisdiction.12 Likewise, if a statute prohibits the trial judge
I United States v. Fletcher, 148 U.S. 84 (1893); Swaim v. United States,
165 U.S. 553 (1897); Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365 (1902); Collins v.
McDonald, 258 U.S. 416 (1922); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); Hum-
phrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695 (1949); In re Corbett, Fed. Cas. No. 3,219
(E.D. N.Y. 1877); Rose ex rel. Carter v. Roberts, 99 Fed. 948 (2d Cir.
1900) ; cert. denied sub. nom. Carter v. Roberts, 176 U.S. 684 (1900) ; United
States ex rel Okenfus v. Schulz, 67 F. Supp. 528 (S.D. N.Y. 1946); Bigrow v.
Hiatt, 70 F. Supp. 826, 74 F. Supp. 240 (M.D. Pa. 1947), aff'd, 168 F. 2d 992 (3d
Cir. 1948) ; Krull v. Hiatt, 74 F. Supp. 349 (M.D. Pa. 1947) ; McDaniel v. Hiatt,
78 F. Supp. 573 (M.D. Pa. 1948); Lewis v. Sanford, 79 F. Supp. 77 (N.D.
Ga. 1948); Adams v. Hiatt, 79 F. Supp. 433 (M.D. Pa. 1948); Ex parte
Steele, 79 F. Supp. 428 (M.D. Pa. 1943); Montalvo v. Hiatt, 174 F. 2d 645
(5th Cir. 1949); Duval v. Humphrey, 83 F. Supp. 457 (M.D. Pa. 1949);
McClellan v. Humphrey, 83 F. Supp. 510 (M.D. Pa. 1949); Hayes v. Hunter,
83 F. Supp. 940 (D. Kans. 1948). Contra: Hicks v. Hiatt, 64 F. Supp. 238
(M.D. Pa. 1946). Cf. United States ex rel. Marino v. Hildreth, 61 F. Supp.
667 (E.D. N.Y. 1945); Boone v. Nelson, 72 F. Supp. 807 (D. Me. 1947); Burns
ex rel. Burns v. Sanford, 77 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. Ga. 1948).
Rogers v. United States, 270 U.S. 154 (1926) ; In re Yamashita, 327 U.S.
1 (1946) ; United States ex rel. Okenfus v. Schulz, note 125, supra; Adams v.
Hiatt, note 125, supra; Ex parte Steele, note 125, supra; McClellan v. Hum-
phrey, note 125, supra. Cf. Burns ex rel. Burns v. Sanford, 77 F. Supp. 464
(N.D. Ga. 1948).
1 Carter v. Woodring, 92 F. 2d 544 (D.C. Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S.
752 (1937); McDaniel v. Hiatt, 78 F. Supp. 573 (M.D. Pa. 1948). Contra:
Hicks v. Hiatt, 64 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1946).
"3 Collins v. McDonald, 258 U.S. 416 (1922) ; Burall v. Johnston, 134 F. 2d
614 (9th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 768 (1943), rehearing denied, 320
U.S. 810, 812 (1943).
In re Meader, 60 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. N.Y. 1945); Richardson v. Zuppan,
81 F. Supp. 809 (M.D. Pa. 1949). Accord (federal district court sentence):
Price v. Johnston, 125 F. 2d 806 (9th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 677
(1942), rehearing denied, 316 U.S. 712 (1942). Cf. Romero v. Squier, 133 F.
2d 528 (9th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 785 (1943); Grewe v. France,
75 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Wis. 1948).
Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65 (U.S. 1857); Runkle v. United States, 122
U.S. 543 (1887). Cf. Mullan v. United States, 212 U.S. 516 (1909).
'United States v. Hunt, 254 Fed. 365 (S.D. N.Y. 1918).
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advocate from attending closed sessions of the court-martial, his
presence at such a session may oust jurisdiction. 13 2 If a statute
requires the presence of the accused at the trial, a court-martial
which proceeds in his absence is probably without jurisdiction.133
No doubt proceeding in the absence of a statutory quorum, or in
the absence of the law member when his presence is required by
statute, would oust jurisdiction. 134 Except in such rare cases, in
which the irregularity goes to the constitution of the tribunal or
its jurisdiction over the person or the subject-matter, the failure
of a military tribunal to follow statutory or executive regulations
governing its procedure does not subject its judgment to collateral
attack.135
Until recent years it was well settled that the denial by a civil
court in a criminal case of rights guaranteed by the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments to the Constitution did not subject its judgment
to collateral attack. 30 By a series of fairly recent decisions the
United States Supreme Court greatly expanded the functions of
the writ of habeas corpus as a method of reviewing decisions of
state and federal courts in criminal cases, extending the scope of
inquiry to denials of rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments which operated to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial as conceived by the common law.1 3 7 One of these decisions
'United States ex rel. Innes v. Crystal, 131 F. 2d 576 (2d Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 755 (1943), rehearing denied, 319 U.S. 783 (1943).
Contra (not jurisdictional) : En parte Tucker, 212 Fed. 569 (D. Mass. 1913);
United States ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F. 2d 664 (3d Cir. 1944).
11 See Weirman v. United States, 36 Ct. Cl. 236 (1901).
A.W. 8, §206, Title II, Act June 24, 1948, 62 STAT. 628, 10 U.S.C.A. §10
provides "That no general court-martial shall receive evidence or vote upon its
findings or sentence in the absence of the law member regularly detailed." Cf.
Duval v. Humphrey, 83 F. Supp. 457 (M.D. Pa. 1949).
Keyes v. United States, 109 U.S. 336 (1883) (that officer who signed the
charges acted as a witness for the prosecution and also as a member of the
court not jurisdictional); MecMicking v. Schields, 238 U.S. 99 (1915) (that
military tribunal refused compliance with an executive regulation requiring
it to grant an accused two days in which to prepare his defense not
jurisdictional).
' Matter of Moran, 203 U.S. 96 (1906) ; Goto v. Lane, 265 U.S. 393 (1924).
'E.g., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1922) (court under mob pressure);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (denial of counsel); Mooney v. Holohan,
294 U.S. 103 (1935) (prosecution knowingly using perjured testimony and
suppressing the truth); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1937); Walker v.
Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941) (coerced plea of guilty); Smith v. O'Grady,
312 U.S. 329 (1941) (plea of guilty secured by trick); Waley v. Johnston,
316 U.S. 101 (1942) (coerced plea of guilty); Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255
(1942) (denial of right to appeal); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942)
(prosecution securing perjured testimony by threats and intimidating defense
witnesses); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945); Price v. Johnston, 334
U.S. 266 (1948) (prosecution knowingly using perjured testimony). See
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suggested that the denial of the constitutional right involved (coun-
sel) ousted the court's jurisdiction.'38 This is certainly not true
in the usual use of the term "jurisdiction" and the Court itself
recognized that fact in a later opinion by stating that relief would
be granted by habeas corpus if the trial court lacked jurisdiction
or if it denied constitutional rights.13 9 It would seem, then, that
this series of decisions does not change the traditional concept of
jurisdiction; it merely expands the use of the writ of habeas corpus
in the review of judgments of civil courts.
Several inferior federal courts have stated or acted on the as-
sumption that this series of decisions effected a corresponding ex-
tension of the scope of inquiry incident to a collateral attack on a
judgment of a military tribunal 4 0 and one such court has given
relief from a court-martial sentence on the ground of denial of due
process of law.' 4' Several other inferior federal courts have denied
Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 23 (1939) ; The Freedom Writ-The Expand-
ing Use of Federal Habeas Corpus, 61 HARv. L. REy. 657-675 (1948).
mJohnson v. Zerbst, note 137, supra, 468.
''Waley v. Johnston, note 137, supra, 104. See United States ex rel. Innes
v. Hiatt, 141 F. 2d 664, 665-666 (3d Cir. 1944).
"' Schita v. King, 133 F. 2d 283 (8th Cir. 1943) [denial of competent counsel;
intimidation of witnesses; the same court later decided that denial of due
process had not been established, Schita v. Cox, 139 F. 2d 971 (8th Cir. 1944),
cert. denied sub. nom. Schita v. Pescor, 322 U.S. 761 (1944), rehearing denied,
323 U.S. 810 (1944); United States ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F. 2d 664 (3d
Cir. 1944) (trial judge advocate present in closed session; this is the most care-
fully considered opinion adopting this view); Altmayer v. Sanford, 148 F. 2d
161 (5th Cir. 1945) (denial of counsel); Hironimus v. Durant, 168 F. 2d 288
(4th Cir. 1948), cert. denied sub. nom. Durant v. Hironimus, 335 U.S. 818
(1948) ; Jackson v. Gough, 170 F. 2d 630 (5th Cir. 1948), cert. denied sub. norn.
Jackson v. United States, 336 U.S. 938 (1949) (Negroes systematically ex-
cluded from court); Benjamin v. Hunter, 169 F. 2d 512 (10th Cir. 1948)
(pre-trial investigation not impartial); Brown v. Sanford, 170 F. 2d 344 (5th
Cir. 1948) (coerced confession); Montalvo v. Hiatt, 174 F. 2d 645 (5th Cir.
1948); Hicks v. Hiatt, 64 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1946) (improper remarks of
counsel in argument); Boone v. Nelson, 72 F. Supp. 807 (D. Me. 1947)
(coerced confession); O'Malley v. Hiatt, 74 F. Supp. 44 (M.D. Pa. 1947);
Beets v. Hunter, 75 F. Supp. 825 (D. Kans. 1948) (court-martial "saturated
with tyranny"); Flackman v. Hunter, 75 F. Supp. 871 (D. Kans. 1948) (denial
of counsel); Jackson v. Sanford, 79 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. Ga. 1947) (denial of
counsel); Randle v. Sanford, 79 F. Supp. 585 (N.D. Ga. 1946) (inadequate
pre-trial investigation); Durant v. Hiatt, 81 F. Supp. 948 (N.D. Ga. 1948)
(inadequate time in which to prepare defense); Hayes v. Hunter, 83 F. Supp.
940 (D. Kans. 1948). Cf. United States ex rel. Williams v. Barry, 260 Fed.
291 (S.D. N.Y. 1919). As the only cases in which denials of due process were
found to exist are Hicks v. Hiatt and Beets v. Hunter, the denials of certiorari
by the Supreme Court are not significant.
11 Shapiro v. United States, 107 Ct. Cl. 650, 69 F. Supp. 205 (1947) (denial
of continuance to prepare defense). Relief was granted in Beets v. Hunter,
note 140, supra, but it is not clear that the ground was denial of a right under
the Fifth or Sixth Amendment.
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or questioned this extension. 42
The problem of whether the expanded scope of inquiry on
habeas corpus should be considered to extend to review of judg-
ments of military tribunals involves three questions. The first is
whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments have any application
whatever to trials by military tribunals. The language of the
amendments, so far as it relates to procedure, appears to be lim-
ited to procedure in civil trials for crimes. 14 3 The concurring opin-
ion of Chief Justice White in Ex parte Milligan," in which three
other justices joined, stated categorically "the the power of Con-
gress, in the government of the land and naval forces and of the
militia, is not at all affected by the fifth or any other amendment"
and the majority opinion stated that the jury trial provision of
the Sixth Amendment had no application.14- The Supreme Court
has held that the war powers of the government are not affected
"'Waite v. Overlade, 164 F. 2d 722 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S.
812 (1948) (a carefully reasoned opinion, pointing ou that the Supreme
Court has cited with approval in recent opinions the older cases declaring a
narrow scope of review. Two justices dissented from the Supreme Court's
ruling denying certiorari, indicating that the Court considered this a test
case.) ; United States ex rel. Innes v. Crystal, 131 F. 2d 576 (2d Cir. 1943)
cert. denied (case moot), 319 U.S. 755 (1943), rehearing denied, 319 U.S. 783
(1943); Henry v. Hodges, 171 F. 2d 401 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 69 S. Ct.
937 (1949), rehearing denied sub. nom. Henry v. Smith, 69 S. Ct. 1167 (1949)
(inadequate pre-trial investigation); Ex parte Benton, 63 F. Supp. 808 (N.D.
Cal. 1945) (trial judge advocate present at closed session). Cf Wrublewski
v. McInerney, 166 F. 2d 243 (9th Cir. 1948); Richardson v. Zuppan, 81 F.
Supp. 809 (M.D. Pa. 1949). See Collateral Attack on Courts-Martial in the
Federal Courts, 57 YALn L. J. 483-489 (1948); Fairman, op. cit., note 15,
supra, 620-623, 631.
"' Anidt. 5: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, ex-
cept in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life-liberty, or propertywithout due process of law; ..."
Amdt. 6: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assist-
ance of counsel for his defense."
." 4 Wall. 2, 138 (U.S. 1866). Accord: Ex parte Benton, 63 F. Supp. 808
(N.D. Cal. 1945). Cf. Closson v. United States ex rel. Armes, 7 App D.C.
460 (1896).
"'Ibid., 123. Accord (as to military trial for violation of the laws of war):
United States ex rel. Quirin v. Cox, 317 U.S. 1, 29 (1942). See Zucker v.
United States, 161 U.S. 475, 481 (1896).
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by the restrictions imposed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.14
In holding that the trial by jury provision of the Sixth Amendment
is inapplicable to trials by. military tribunal for violation of the
laws or war the Court has recently used language suggesting that
none of the guarantees of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments is
applicable to military trials.1 47 Three years ago it held that the
right of confrontation by witnesses given by the Sixth Amend-
ment does not extend to trials by military tribunal and that that
right is not guaranteed in such trials by the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment. 14 8 It is noteworthy that counsel for the
defense was not guaranteed by statute in military trials until 1916
and the denial of such counsel was not deemed a violation of the
Fifth or Sixth Amendments. 14 9
The then Judge Advocate General of the Army made a very
thorough study of the question some fifty years ago and reached
the conclusion that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment
can have no application to military trials because its guarantee
is of the ordinary process of the civil law, that is, the common law
concept of a fair trial, a concept which has no meaning in a mili-
tary situation.15 Assuming, for the purposes of argument, that
the due process clause does have some application to military tri-
bunals, what meaning can it have as applied to them? The courts
which hold it does apply concede that it does not guarantee a com-
mon law form of trial. 51 The Supreme Court has held that a mili-
"1 Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. 268, 304 (1870). And in Neely v. Henkel,
180 U.S. 109, 122 (1901) the Court said that the provisions of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments have no relation to the trial of an American citizen by a
tribunal constituted by a United States military government of occupied for-
eign territory.
14' United States ex rel. Quirin v. Cox, 317 U.S. 1, 39-45 (1942).
'.In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 18-23 (1946). The dissenting opinions of
Murphy and Rutledge, JJ., indicate that they thought the Court was holding
that the Fifth Amendment is wholly inapplicable to military trials. Ibid., pp.
26-27, 78-81 . See Homma v. Patterson, 327 U.S. 759 (1946). Accord (as to
courts-martial): Mullan v. United States, 42 Ct. Cl. 157, 176 (1907), aff'd,
212 U.S. 516 (1909); Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296 (1911). The use of
depositions in trials by courts-martial is sanctioned by statute. A.W. 25, §
215, Title II, Act June 24, 1948, 62 STAT. 631, 10 U.S.C.A. §1496. See Covington,
Judicial Review of Courts-Martial, 7 GEO. WASH. L. Ruv. 503, 506-507 ((1939).
1'91 WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTs 241 (2d ed. 1896). The
argument that a statute conferring a right to counsel imposes a jurisdictional
requirement is, of course, wholly different from one that the assistance of
counsel provision of the Sixth Amendment or the due process clause of the
Fifth imposes such a requirement. See Hayes v. Hunter, 83 F. Supp. 940 (D.
Kans. 1948).
Lieber, The Supreme Court on the Military Status, 31 Am. L. REV. 342,
343-348 (1897).
'United States ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F. 2d 664, 666 (3d Cir. 1944);
Hicks v. Hiatt, 64 F. Supp, 238 (M.D. Pa. 1946).
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tary tribunal which heard the evidence against the accused in his
absence, denied him the right to see or hear the evidence against
him, and refused to let him cross-examine the witnesses against
him or call any witnesses in his own defense did not deny due
process so long as these acts were not prohibited by statute or
regulation.15  It decided that a trial by court-martial in which the
same person acted as accuser, prosecution witness and judge was
not in excess of jurisdiction.1 3 These procedures certainly did not
satisfy the common law concept of a fair trial or hearing. It would
seem then, that if the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment
has any application whatever to military trials, it does nothing
more than guarantee the procedure prescribed by statute or regu-
lation. It has been seen that violation of a statute or regulation
governing procedure which was intended to be jurisdictional al-
ways has been a ground for collateral attack.15 4 That being so,
even if the expansion of the function of habeas corpus does extend
to military cases, it does not actually broaden the pre-existing scope
of inquiry.
The third question involved in the problem of whether the
broadened scope of habeas corpus extends to military cases is that
of the jurisdiction of the reviewing civil courts. The Supreme
Court has appellate jurisdiction over the federal courts and, in
cases involving federal law, over the state courts. In the absence
of Congressional restriction it may exercise such jurisdiction as
it chooses. Several of the decisions announcing the expanded func-
tion of habeas corpus in civil cases indicate that this is the crea-
tion of a new type of appellate review, usable if other forms of
appellate review are unavailable or inadequate. 155 But neither the
' Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296 (1911). The case involved a Promotion
Board but the opinion is of broader application. It is, of course, unthinkable
that Congress or the military authorities would tolerate such procedure in the
case of a tribunal with penal power. Discharge of career officers of the Regular
Army after a "hearing" of this type is authorized by existing law. §§507,
509, 514, Act Aug. 7, 1947, 61 STAT. 883, 10 U.S.C. §§511, 513, 518 (Supp. 1947).
Cf. Mullan v. United States, 212 U.S. 516 (1909).
Keyes v. United States, 109 U.S. 336 (1883).
Note 130, supra. Most of the allegations of denial of due process made in
the cases cited in note 140, svpra, did not involve violation of any procedural
statute or regulation. The ground for relief in Shapiro v. United States, note
141, svpra, was the denial of a continuance in which to prepare the defense,
no right to which is given by statute or regulation. It was held in In re Yama-
shita, 327 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1946) that such denial of a continuance is not a
ground for collateral attack. Accord (even when an applicable regulation
directs the granting of a continuance under such circumstance) : McMickins v.
Schields, 238 .S. 99 (1915). The opinions cited in note 140 and 141, supra,
appear to import alien common law concepts into military law.
I Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1922) ; Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103
(1935); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942); Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S.
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Supreme Court nor any other civil court has appellate jurisdiction
over military tribunals.156 This being so, the federal civil courts
have no power to extend a new form of appellate review over such
tribunals. That the expanded function of habeas corpus is inappli-
cable to review of judgments of military tribunals is implicit in
the language of a recent opinion of the Supreme Court.
57
THE EFFECT OF ARTICLES OF WAR 50 AND 53
The rule that a judgment of a court-martial is subject to col-
lateral attack to the same extent as a judgment of a justice of
the peace 5 8 was adopted at a time when the jurisdiction of courts-
martial over offenses was narrowly limited, when they numbered
no lawyers among their membership, and when their judgments
were not subject to appellate review.159 The jurisdiction of general
courts-martial of the Army and Air Force over offenses has been
expanded to include all crimes cognizable by a federal district
court, the common law crimes, military offenses and violations of
the laws of war. 60 In 1920 Congress provided that each general
court-martial should have a law member, that every record of trial
by general court-martial should be reviewed by the staff judge
advocate of the appointing authority, and that every such record
should be further reviewed for legal sufficiency, in the Office of
the Judge Advocate General, who was given power to reverse con-
victions.'6 ' After this the Supreme Court held that the rule which
applied to the judgment of a justice of the peace and like inferior
tribunals, that it is void on its face unless the record upon which
it is based shows all jurisdictional requisites, is inapplicable to
the judgment of a general court-martial.162
By legislation effective this year Congress provided that the
law member of a general court-martial must be an officer of the
Judge Advocate General's Corps, or a member of the bar of a
255 (1942). Presumably the Supreme Court may use federal district courts as
its agents for the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
' Note 4, supra.
In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 23 (1946). The dissenting opinions of Mur-
phy and Rutledge, JJ., indicate that they thought the Court's language meant
this. Ibid., pp. 30-31, 46, 80. See Homma v. Patterson, 327 U.S. 759 ((1946).
'Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch 331 (U.C. 1806); Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet.
193 (U.S. 1830); Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879).
'Ex parte Mason, 256 Fed. 384 (C.C. N.D. N.Y. 1882) (no appellate re-
view). See Fratcher, op. cit., note 4, supra, 39-40.
.' A.W. 54-96, §1, ch. II, Act June 4, 1920, 41 STAT. 800, 10 U.S.C. §1526
et seq., as amended by §§231 et seq., Title II, Act June 24, 1948, 62 STAT.
639 et seq.
A.W. 46, 50 1/2, §1, ch. II, Act June 4, 1920, 41 STAT. 796, 797, 10 U.S.C.
§§1517, 1522.
'Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U.S. 11 (1921).
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federal civil court or the highest court of a state certified by The
Judge Advocate General to be qualified, and that the defense coun-
sel must be a lawyer if the trial judge advocate is a lawyer. 63
The same legislation extends the scope of appellate review in the
Office of The Judge Advocate General to include the weight and
sufficiency of evidence, provides, in effect, that all cases involving
confinement for more than one year or any other severe punish-
ment shall be reviewed there by a board of review of not less than
three officers of the Judge Advocate General's Corps, and requires
further review of serious cases by a Judicial Council composed of
three general officers of the Judge Advocate General's Corps and
by The Judge Advocate General.164 The legislation provides, more-
over, that, upon application made within one year after the com-
pletion of appellate review, The Judge Advocate General may grant
a new trial, vacate a sentence, and restore rights, privileges and
property affected by such sentence.165
It may be that the old scope of collateral attack is still appro-
priate as to judgments of special and summary courts-martial and
military tribunals with no system of appellate review. But it is
inappropriate to attribute to a judgment of a general court-martial
reviewed in accordance with the statute no more weight than the
judgment of a justice of the peace. Certainly a federal district
judge who has had no experience or training in military matters
should hesitate before overruling on a technical question of mili-
tary law the considered judgment of general officers of the Judge
Advocate General's Corps who have devoted their entire lives to
the study and practice of that law. It may be questioned whether
the civil courts are well qualified to do justice on such matters.
Congress has now declared that the sentences of general courts-
martial which have been reviewed in accordance with the statute
shall be final and conclusive and that action taken pursuant to
them shall be binding upon all courts of the United States.166 This
is a declaration that general courts-martial are no longer inferior
tribunals but superior courts of record whose judgments are en-
titled to the same respect and conclusive effect as those of the
superior civil courts. It is submitted that, under this statutory
declaration, a duly reviewed sentence of a general court-martial
should not be any more subject to collateral attack than a judg-
ment of a federal district court which has been affirmed by a
I-A.W. 8, 11, §§206, 208, Title IH, Act June 24, 1948, 62 STAT. 628, 629,
10 U.S.C.A. §§1479, 1482.
- A.W. 50, §226, Title II, Act June 24, 1948, 62 STAT. 635, 10 U.S.C.A.
§1521. See Fratcher, op. cit., note 4, supra, 62-66.
I-A.W. 53, §230, Title II, Act June 24, 1948, 62 STAT. 639, 10 U.S.C.A.
§1525.
'Notes 5, 17, supra.
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United States Court of Appeals. For the reasons advanced in the
preceding section, such a sentence should not be subject to collateral
attack for denial of rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments to the Constitution.
